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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Conflict of Laws-Constitutional Law-Federal Courts-Effect
of State Court's Refusal to Assume Jurisdiction

Plaintiff, a citizen of Virginia, sought to recover of the defendant, a
citizen of North Carolina, the deficiency remaining upon purchase money
notes given for a conveyance of real estate located in Virginia. The
contract of sale was for Virginia land, was made in Virginia, and was
to be performed there. Upon default on one of the notes and foreclosure under an acceleration provision contained in the deed of trust,
the trustee sold the land and applied the proceeds to the payment of
the notes. There remained a deficiency and the plaintiff sought judgment for the balance in the state courts of North Carolina. Recovery
was denied.' The court held that a North Carolina statute2 had de'Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E. (2d) 411, 136 A. L. R. 1054
(1941).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §45-36. "In all sales of real property by mort-

gagees and/or trustees under powers of sale contained in any mortgage or deed
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prived the courts here of jurisdiction to give deficiency judgment. The
necessary jurisdictional amount and diversity of citizenship being present, the plaintiff 'brought his action in the federal district court and obtained judgment for the deficiency. Upon appeal to the Circuit Court
of Appeals it was Held:3 The interpretation given the statute by the
North Carolina court 4 to the effect that it applies only to the procedural
law of the state was binding upon the federal courts, and since the federal courts are bound to follow the state law only in substantive matters, while applying their own procedure, the statute would not bar
recovery.
Here we have a situation where the result reached depended upon
the forum one chose, which is opposed to the policy behind Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins5 and the cases furthering it.0 Paradoxically the
variance in this instance is the result of the federal court following the
"judge made law" of the state.
State courts have used at least three reasons for not applying the
conflict of laws rule that would call for an application of foreign law:
(1) A lack of jurisdiction in the forum court. (2) No form of action
to grant the relief. 7 (3)Public policy forbids.8
of trust executed after February 6, 1933, or where judgment or decree is given
for the foreclosure of any mortgage executed after February 6, 1933, to secure
the balance of the purchase price of real property, the mortgagee or trustee or
holder of the notes secured by such mortgage or deed of trust shall nbt be entitled
t6 a deficiency judgment on account of such mortgage, deed of trust or obligation
secured by the same."
' Angel v. Bullington, 150 Fed. (2d) 679 (C. C. A. 4th, 1945) certiorarigranted,
Dec. 8, 1945, 66 S. Ct. 231.
Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 20, 16 S. E. (2d) 411, 412, 136 A. L. R.
1054, 1056 (1941) ("It will be noted that the limitation ceated by the statute is upon
the jurisdiction of the courts .... This closes the courts of this state to one who
seeks a deficiency judgment on a note given for the purchase price of real property. The statute operates upon the adjective law of the state which pertains to
the practice and procedure or legal machinery by which the substantive law is
made effective and not upon the substantive law itself. It is a limitation upon the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state.").
8304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
CCf.
Guaianty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 109, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 1470, 89
L. ed. 2079, 2086 (1945) ("The nub of the policy that underlies Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a nonresident litigant in a federal court instead of in a state court a block away, should
not lead to a substantially different result.").
"Slater v. Mexican National Railway Co., 194 U. S. 120, 24 S. Ct 581 48
L. ed. 900 (1904) ; 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §608.1; GOODRICH, eoNFLIcr ov' LAWS (1938) p. 21; Howard Undertaking Co. v. Fidelity Life Ass'n, 59
S. W. (2d) 746 (Mo. App. 1933).
'The following cases illustrate the variety of policies that have been invoked
to prevent the courts of the forum from recognizing foreign "rights." Gooch v.
Faucett, 122 "N.C. 270, 29 S. E. 362, 39 L. R. A. 825 (1898); Maxey v. Railey
and Bro. Banking Co., 57 S. W. (2d) 1091 (Mo. App. K. C. 1933) (gambling
debt) ; Security Co. v. Hendry, 189 N. C. 549, 127 S. E. 629 (1925) ; Young v.
Nave, 135 Kan. 23, 10 P. (2d) 23 (1932) (payment of attorney fees for the collection of a note) ; Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S. E. 604 (1935) (personal injury action by husband against wife); Commercial Credit Co. v. Higbee,
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In deciding that the statute was a limitation upon the jurisdiction of
the state courts the Supreme Court is within the rationale of the rule
that since jurisdiction is conferred on courts by the sovereign that created
them, the local law determines whether or not its courts have power to
entertain a given case.9 Thig method of not adjudicating foreign
"rights" was used where a statute 0 after defining a gambling contract
provides that the courts of this state have no jurisdiction to entertain
a suit upon a judgment based upon such a contract," the contract being
valid where made notwithstanding. A striking example of a state withdrawing the jurisdiction of its courts to adjudicate a foreign right is
an Illinois statute' 2 providing that no action shall be brought in courts
of that state for wrongful death occurring elsewhere.' 3 A court's declaration that it is without jurisdiction to enforce a foreign "right" is
not often unexplained. More frequently the method is explained as a
means of effectuating public policy.' 4 The state court in the principal
case did not mention public policy, but rested its decision solely on what
it found to be a statutory withdrawal of jurisdiction, without explaining
why the legislature had so limited its power. But the bare fact that the
court construed the statute as closing the doors of the state courts to
this type of action is evidence of what the court thought the public
policy of the state to be, if not an actual declaration of it. However, it
1

92 Colo. 346, 20 P. (2d) 543 (1933) (conditional sales contract registered in foreign state but not in forum); Hudson v. Vonhamm, 85 Cal. A. 323, 259 P. 374
(1927) (action against father for tort of minor child) ; Ulman, Magil and Jordan
Woolen Co. v. Magill, 155 Ga. 555, 117 S. E. 657 (1923) (wife as surety for
husband).
There is a strong policy in every state toward recognizing validly created foreign "rights."
:3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §586.1.
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §16-3.
" Burus v. Whitcover, 158 N. C. 384, 74 S. E. 11, 39 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1005
(1912). More difficulty was encountered when the illegal contract was the basis
of a foreign judgment, and the judgment was sued on here. Cf. Mottu v. Davis,
151 N. C. 237, 65 S. E. 972 (1909). Held: If the gaming question were raised
and decided in the Virginia decision it would be binding here See also, Cody v.
Harvey, 219 N. C. 369, 14 S. E. (2d) 30 (1941). Held: The trial court should
find the facts as to whether the plaintiff's claim was based on a gaming transaction, and if so whether tie question were raised by appropriate plea in the trial
of the case in the foreign court. Pleading the statute is in the nature of a plea
to the jurisdiction which cannot be conferred by a failure of the defendant to
plead properly. Note 18 N. C. L. REv. 224 (1940).
1ILL. ANx. STAT. (Smith-Hurd 1934) c. 70 §2.
Daugherty v. American McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 619,
L. R. A. 1915 F 955, Ann. Cas. 1913D 568 (1912).
The effect of the, statute was limited by Kenny v. Supreme Lodge of the World
Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U. S. 411, 40 S. Ct. 371, 64 L. ed. 638, 10 A. L. R.
716 (1920) holding that the statute could not constitutionally withhold jurisdiction
when the suit was on a foreign judgment.
"Gooch v. Faucett, 122 N. C. 270, 29 S. E. 362, 39 L. R.. A. 835 (1898);
Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 301 Mass. 275, 21 N. E. (2d) 244 (1939) ; Herzog v.
Stern, 264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23 (1934) ; Weidman v. Wei'dman, 274 Mass. 118,
174 N. E. 206, 76 A. L. R. 1359 (1931) ; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179 (1857).
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is submitted that the statute could with equal logic have been construed
as fixing the substantive rights of the parties in purchase money mortgage transactions by limiting the creditor to the property conveyed, and
only applicable to transactions affecting North Carolina real estate. "
This was the position taken by the Oregon court in a like situation. 1
That court adopted the view that its statute was meant only to affect
real estate in Oregon, and did not establish a local policy against deficiency judgments except for purchase money mortgages on land located
there.
Now that we have the state court decision characterizing the statute
as not affecting the substantive rights of the parties, but only the jurisdiction of the state courts, how does this construction affect the federal
courts sitting here? Since 1938, when the tables were turned and the
federal courts were required to follow the substantive law-including
the judge made law-of the state in which they are sitting, and their
own procedure, characterization of a matter as proceduralor substantive
has become increasingly important. 7 To deny a litigant recovery in a
state court because to give relief would contravene some settled public
policy is a rule of conflict of laws which is a matter of substance to be
followed in the federal courts.' 8 Whether the state court's refusal to
take jurisdiction, when not based on public policy, results in a rule of
substande to be followed in the federal courts is doubtful. Thus it was
held that the federal court sitting in Illinois was not deprived of jurisdiction by the Illinois wrongful death statute prohibiting such actions in
the state courts where the cause of action arose outside the state. 19 But
whether the federal court has jurisdiction, and a determination of the
law it shall follow once it assumes jurisdiction, are separate questions.
Obviously the state can neither 'by statute nor decision deprive the fed20
eral courts of jurisdiction, that being the sole function of their creator.
" Suppose a purchase money mortgage on North Carolina real estate and the
mortgagor has since moved to Virginia. It would seem odd that the statute should
not prevent a Virginia court giving a deficiency judgment if there remained a
balance after foreclosure here.
"' McGirl v. Brewer, 32 Ore. 422, 285 P. 208 (1930); but see, Federal Dopositors
Insurance Corp. v. Stensland, - S. D. -,
15 N. W. (2d) 8 (1944).
"TSee, Cook, The Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws (1942) 36 ILL. L.
REv. 493.
"' Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. ed. 1481, 134 A. L. R.
1462 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U. S. 487,
61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L. ed. 1487 (1941). See also, Order of the United States
Commercial Travelers of America v. Meinson, 131 Fed. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 8th,
1942) ; Sampson v. Channell, 118 Fed. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. lst), 128 A. L. R. 394
(1940).
" Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western Railway, 110 Fed. (2d) 401 (C. C. A.
7th), 132 A. L. R. 455 (1940) (cert. dismissed under rule 35, 311 U. S. 720).
Since Illinois allows an action for wrongful death occurring within the state,
it is clear that the statute did not spring from public policy against such actions
as such, but was a court calendar relieving device.
1* 1 MooRxs FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) §2.07.
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The question in the principal case is not one of jurisdiction but rather
what is the law for the federal court sitting in North Carolina, after
assuming jurisdiction. Does the public policy of a state which is so
strong that by statute it has deprived its courts of jurisdiction to entertain suits of a particular nature bind the federal courts sitting in that
state to follow the public policy of the state and refuse relief, although
the state court of last resort has interpreted such statute as not affecting
substantive rights but merely the adjective or procedural law? It was
decided in the Griffin2 ' case that it was for the state to say whether a
contract contrary to such a statute or rule of law is so offensive to its
view of public welfare as to require its courts to close their doors to its
enforcement. Once this is done the federal courts sitting in that state
are bound to follow such a conflict of laws rule. Should the fact that
the state court failed to mention, in construing a statute as dosing its
doors, the reason for such a statute, or the courts characterization of the
statute as proceduraland not substantive, change the rule of law that is
to be followed in the federal courts? Obviously the fact that the state
court declared its courts without jurisdiction should not mean that the
public policy of the state is favorable to such actions. Neither is the
state court's characterization controlling in the federal courts.2 It has
been held by a federal district court that the Massachusetts statute
abolishing "heart balm" actions was such evidence of the public policy
of Massachusetts as to be binding on the federal courts, although the
cause of action arose outside Massachusetts and the state court had not
decided that an action of such nature could not be maintained in the
state court, where it arose in a state that allowed the action.2 It has
likewise been held that the federal district court sitting in New York
was bound to follow the New York state rule of forum. non conveniens and not assume jurisdiction over matters involving the internal
affairs of a corporation when in the view of the state court considerations of efficiency, convenience or justice point to the courts of the
24
domicile of the corporation as the appropriate tribunals.
It is submitted that if the statute as construed by the state court is
21313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. ed. 1481, 134 A. L. R. 1462 (1941) cited
supra note 18.
"Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L. ed. 1418
(1945); Sampson v. Channell, 110 Fed. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 1st), 128 A. L. R.
394 (1940). In both these cases the state court had called procedural what the

court was required to follow as substantive.
federal
2

"Fahy v. Lloyd, 57 Fed. Supp. 156 (D. Mass. 1944); contra: Wawrzin v.
Rosenberg, 12 Fed. Supp. 548 (E. D. N. Y. 1935); noted 14 N. C. L. REV. 286

before Erie Railroad v. Tompkins and the cases cited supra note 18).
(decided
2

Weiss v. Routh, 149 Fed. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). But cf. Williams
v. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 326 U. S. - , 66 S. Ct. 284, 90 L. ed. 247 (1945)

(The court left open the question of whether the federal court was bound to follow the state's forum non conveniens rule.).
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constitutional it evidences a conflict of laws rule that is binding upon
the federal court sitting in this state. The constitutionality of the statute,
as construed by the state court remains to be discussed 25 for obviously,
if the statute is unconstitutional as construed, the federal court should
not be required to follow it as evidencing a public policy or for any other
26
reason.
Generally speaking, the forum will apply the law of a sister state
which is the situs of a contract or other cause of action, but the question here raised is to what extent the forum is compelled, by the federal
constitution, to apply the law of a sister state. The clauses most urged
as requiring the forum to adjudicate "foreign created rights" are the
"full faith and credit" and the "due process" clauses. 27 Just how far
these clauses require a sister state to adjudicate or recognize "foreign
rights" is not certain, and can only be determined by a process of inclusion and exclusion. That the full faith and credit clause applies to
judgments though the original cause of action could not be maintained
in the forum is settled ;28 and notwithstanding the inference in Anglo
American Provision Co. v. Davis,2 this rule cannot be flouted by the
simple device of withdrawing jurisdiction from the state courts3 0
A statute of a sister state must be given full faith and credit when
the forum does not have sufficient interest in the litigation to justify
overriding it for reasons of public policy ;31 and a state may not under
the guise of merely affecting the remedy deny the enforcement of claims
that are within this protection of the full faith and credit clause.3 2 The
dividing line between conflicting interest which determines how far a
state must go in recognizing a statute of a sister state has never been
clearly drawn, but has varied with the facts of each case. A share"' The court found this to be an interesting question that it was not called

upon to decide. Angel v. Bullington, 150 Fed. (2d) 679, 681 (C. C. A. 4th, 1945).
. It could hardly be argued that the state court's decision was res adjudicata
in the federal court, no decision on the merits having been given.
" The "privileges and immunities clause" has no application where the state
applies the same rule of law to its own citizens as to citizens from other states.
Chambers v. Baltimore and 0. R. Co., 207 U. S. 142, 28 S. Ct. 34, 52 L. ed. 143
(1917). Neither would the impairment of contract clause be applicable here, since
that clause applies only where the statute has been enacted since the contract
involved was made. New Orleans Co. v. Louisiana Co., 125 U. S. 18, 8 S. Ct.
741, 31 L. ed. 607 (1888), and here the statute was made specifically applicable
only to transactions subsequent to its enactment.
" Fauntleroy v. Lure, 210 U. S. 230, 28 S. Ct. 641, 52 L. ed. 1039 (1908) ; cf.
Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449, 48 S. Ct. 142, 72 L. ed. 365 (1928). Note
(1928) 6 N. C. L. Rrv. 479.
0 191 U. S. 373, 24 S. Ct. 92, 48 L. ed. 225 (1903).
" Kenny v. Supreme Lodge of the World Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U. S.
411, 40 S. Ct. 371, 64 L. ed. 638, 10 A. L. R. 716 (1920).
"' Bradford Electric Light and Power Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 157, 52 S. Ct.
571, 76 L. ed. 1033, 82 A. L. R. 696 (1932) ; see Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial
Accident Comm., 294 U. S. 532, 55 S. Ct. 518, 79 L. ed. 1044 (1935).
" Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 55 S. Ct. 589, 79 L. ed. 1100, 100 A. L.
R. 1113 (1935).
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holder's liability to pay an assessment levied in accordance with the
statutory law of the corporation's domicile must not be denied by a
sister state,m while statutory liability of a married woman on a guaranty for her husband need not be enforced by a sister state when to
do so contravenes its public policy 3 4 A state may refuse enforcement
of an insurance contract on the life of one of its citizens, because of
local policy against insurance without' an insurable interest according
to its law, even though, by the statutory law of a sister state where the
contract was made the beneficiary had such an interest. 35 A statutory
right to interest on a judgment from the time an action is begun does
not override a sister state's policy against such interest calculation, when
the judgment is against one of the forum's corporate citizens.36 These
last two cases would indicate that the present trend is toward the conclusion that if the forum state has sufficient interest connection with the
persons, property, and events in the litigation to have a public policy
against the enforcement of rights under a sister state's statute the full
37
faith and credit clause does not require the enforcement of such rights.
No case has been found to the effect that a state must give full faith
and credit to the common law of a sister state and it is probably under
such law that the plaintiff in the principal case depends for his right to
a deficiency judgment.38
In the principal case, if the cause of action 'became a "vested right"
only within Virginia it is not a deprivation of property without due
process of law for North Carolina not to recognize that right. Even if we
accept the view that Virginia could create a right operative by its own
power beyond her borders it could hardly be argued that North Carolina's failure to do anything about that right had deprived the plaintiff of property without due process of law. It is when a state has taken
foreign rights and with that basis has created a substantially different
right, by the elimination of a valid defense, that the due process clause
has been invoked to deny the forum the right to make over this obligation of the parties. 39 No case has been found where this clause has been
:a Ibid.
'4Union Trust Co. v. Grossman, 245 U. S. 412, 62 L. ed. 368, 38 S. Ct. 147
(1918).
as Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. ed. 1481, 134 A. L.
R. 1462 (1941), cited supra note 18.
"aKlaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U. S. 487, 61 S. Ct.
1020,7 85 L. ed. 1487 (1941), cited supra note 18.
Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. ed. 1481, 1487, 134
A. L. R. 1462 (1941), cited supra note 35.
s See Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decision in
the Field of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 533, at 545. "Refusal by
the courts of another state to give effect to such inchoate law could hardly be
described as a failure to give full faith and credit to a public act, record or
judicial proceeding."
""John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178, 57 S. Ct. 129,
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held to compel a state to adjudicate a "foreign right."
Before Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, a limited uniformity of law
within the federal courts was brought about by the application of the
"general law" doctrine. However, since that decision the emphasis has
been on uniformity between the state and federal courts within a given
state and the differences existing between the states, due to conflicting
laws or policies, charged to our political system.4 0 It would seem that
by the court's present interpretations of the full faith and credit or the
due process clauses the statute as construed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court is constitutional. It remains to be seen whether the
United States Supreme Court in the consideration of this case, now
before it, will see fit to extend the interpretation of these clauses so as
to preclude a state from assuming the position which North Carolina
has taken.
CYRUS F. LEE.
Evidence-Negative Testimony-Silence as Hearsay
In an action to recover land sold in a tax foreclosure proceeding,
plaintiff sought to establish that the commissioner purchased at his own
sale through the wife of one L. L testified that his wife, now dead, did
not in his presence pay any consideration for the commissioner's deed
to her or receive any consideration for her deed to the commissioner,
executed a month later. L joined in the second deed and was present
when it was signed. L also stated that his wife did nothing but housework, that he knew she never inherited any money, that he never gave
her any large sum, and that he saw her every day. L's testimony (A)
that he knew all about his wife's business, (B) that he knew she neither
paid nor received anything for the deeds, and (C) that he never heard
her say she paid or received any money was excluded by the trial court.
The Supreme Court affirmed a nonsuit granted at the close of plaintiff's
evidence, and held the testimony above properly excluded by the ban
against hearsay.1 After referring to L's testimony about events occurring in his presence, the court said: "Any other knowledge he had is
necessarily predicated upon hearsay, and is incompetent." 2
(A)
A fundamental rule of admissibility is that a witness to a fact must
81 L. ed. 106 (1936); Hartford Acc. and Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land
Co., 292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. ed. 1178, 92 A. L. R. 928 (1934) ; Note
(1935) 13 N. C. L. Rav. 213; Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 50 S. Ct.
338. 74 L. ed. 926, 74 A. L. R. 701 (1930).
"0Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U. S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020,
1022, 85 L. ed. 1487 (1941), cited supra note 36.
'Hinson

v. Morgan, 225 N. C. 740, 36 S. E. (2d) 266 (1945); Hinson v.

Baumrind,
225 N. C. 740, 36 S. E. (2d) 266 (1945) (companion case).
2
Id.at 744, 36 S. E. (2d) at 269.
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3
speak from personal knowledge. It follows that this knowledge must
be based on observation by the senses, not on hearsay, 4 and that it
must involve rational inferences from adequate data. 5 Thus, L's statement that he knew all about his wife's business is not only a bold assertion by any husband but is subject to the legal objection that his
knowledge could not be wholly from observation, but was necessarily
based in part on what his wife told him about her affairs. Although
there are exceptions to the rule, 6 testimony based'even in part on hearsay is inadmissible, 7 and exclusion of this evidence rests on that ground.
If, however, the trial court's ruling had been otherwise, it should not
have been reversible error, for no jury could have been misled by the
sweeping nature of L's assertion.
(B)
To determine the admissibility of L's statement that his wife did not
pay or receive any consideration an analysis of its foundation is necessary. If based on his wife's remarks that she paid and received nothing,
L's statement is founded directly on hearsay and is for that reason inadmissible. But his testimony as a whole reveals that she told him nothing,
that the bases for his assertion are first, his knowledge of his wife's
incapacity to pay, second, his failure to observe any payment or receipt
of money at any time, and third, his failure to hear his wife say she
paid or received any money.
Lack of money or other resources is relevant circumstantial evidence
to prove non-payment, 8 and assuming normal opportunities to observe,
L's observation of his wife's lack of resources is one support for his
conclusion that his wife did not pay for the land. Whether it is sufficient by itself is another question.
With reference to its second foundation, L's statement is negative
testimony, testimony that a fact did not occur, founded on his failure
to observe a fact which he would supposedly have observed if it had
occurred. 9 Such testimony is accepted by courts in a variety of situations, 10 the most common of which is proving failure to give warning
s Wix&oE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §§650-721 (hereinafter cited as WIGMoRo).
'Id. at §657.
Id. at §§659-63.
Old. at §§665-70.
' Buck v. Robinson, 128 Conn. 376, 23 A. (2d) 157 (1941) (attorney's statement on execution of will inadmissible because based partly on hearsay) ; Finley
v. Pafford, 104 S. W. (2d) 163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (testimony that deceased

invested money in certain land excluded as based on hearsay and "personal association with deceased") ; 31 C. J. S. §§200-3.
8WIGmORE

0

§89.

Id. at §664.

'0 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76, 11 S. Ct. 720, 35 L. ed. 371 (1890)

(witness had never, over period of years, seen insured intoxicated or intemperate) ;
Clark County Const. Co. v. Richards Administrator, 202 Ky. 276, 259 S. W. 331

276

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

11

signals at railroad crossings. The basis for an assertion that no signal
was given or no payment was made must be that the witness would
have heard the signal or seen the payment if it had been made. The
facts must show adequately that the event could hardly have taken place
12
without his knowing about it.
Although there is no express recognition of it, the court evidently
felt that L's failure to observe any consideration passing between the
parties, either at the gigning of the deeds or at any other time, was not
sufficient ground for his conclusion. In other words, the inference from
the fact of L's non-observance to the fact of non-payment was no more
natural or probable than an inference of payment unknown to him. In
an earlier North Carolina case,13 on an issue of service of summons on
S, testimony that S's children never heard her say anything about a
summons having been served was held incompetent as akin to hearsay
and as proving nothing, "and if it proved anything, would tend to show
that she had been served.' 4 Without a showing that a witness would
have known of the event had it occurred, his negative statement is
based on insufficient testimonial knowledge and is disregarded or ex(1924) (nearby workers heard no warning or directions given decedent); Kelly
v. Knights of Father Mathew, 179 Mo. App. 608, 162 S. W. 682 (1913) (witnesses
did not hear deceased resign in open meeting) ; Strawn v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry.,
120 Mo. App. 135, 96 S. W. 488 (1906) (that particular goods were not seen or
received offered to show non-delivery of one of several cases of goods by railroad) ;
Purnell v. Raleigh & G. R. R., 122 N. C. 832, 29 S.E. 953 (1898) (witnesses
saw no light or signalman on train) ; Cawfield v. Asheville St. Ry., 111 N. C. 597,
16 S. E. 703 (1892) (street railway employees did not see plaintiff fall from
step); Henderson v. Crouse, 52 N. C. 623 (1860) (witnesses had never known
slave to be sick) ; McBee v. McBee, 22 Ore. 329, 29 Pac. 887 (1892) (witnesses
had never seen husband drunk); Kirby Lumber Co. v. Chambers, 95 S.W. 607
(Tex. Civ. App. 1906) (foreman never heard of broken water main) ; Bennett v.
Robertson, 107 Vt. 202, 177 AtI. 625, 98 A. L. R. 152, 161 (1935) (witness did
not see skidmark at scene of accident) ; Comstock's Administrator v. Jacobs, 84
Vt. 277, 78 At. 1017 (1911) (wife had never heard any directions given husband
by aged couple as to use of property, excluded) ; Hinton v. Cream City R. R., 65
Wis. 323, 27 N. W. 147 (1886) (passengers did not hear bell rung on trolley);
WIGMORE §664 n. 1.
11 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Stepp, 164 Fed. 785 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908) ; Carey
v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 75 Cal. App. 129, 242 Pac. 97, 10 MINN. L. Rav. 543
(1926); Holmes v. Pa. R. R., 74 N. J.L. 469, 66 AtI. 412 (1907), (1909) 12
ANN. CAS. 1031, 1033; Carruthers v. Atlantic & Yadkin Ry., 218 N. C. 49, 9
S. E. (2d) 498 (1940); White v. Southern Ry., 151 Va. 302, 144 S.E. 424, 15
VA. L. REV. 199 (1928), (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 416; Notes (1930) 66
A. L. R. 1532, 1537, (1935) 98 A. L. R. 161, (1929) 42 HARv.L.REv. 422, (1936)
70 U. S. L. REV. 179.
1" Harper v. Harper, 252 Fed. 39 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918) (testimony that neighbor
observed no impropriety between defendant and plaintiff's wife inadmissible on
issue of criminal conversation); Trimble v. Tantlinger, 104 Iowa 665, 74 N. W. 25
(1898) (witnesses never heard defendant defame plaintiff, inadmissible) ; Sneed v.
Ellison, 116 S. W. (2d) 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (maker's testimony that note
was unpaid was "rank hearsay" where another person had assumed payment of
note1" and
have Commissioners
paid it).
Lakemight
Drainage
v. Spencer, 174 N. C. 36, 93 S.E. 435 (1917).
14 Ibid.
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Notice, however, that the trial judge permitted L to testify

over objection, 15' that he knew his wife never inherited any money.
Why isn't this statement open to the same objection?
As a basis for L's belief that no payment was made, the testimony
that he never heard his wife say she paid or received any money may
be questioned on two grounds. It may be hearsay, inadmissible on its
own and insufficient to bolster L's assertion of non-payment. Or even
if not hearsay, it may not provide adequate data from which a reasonable inference of non-payment can be drawn; if so, it would not be independently admissible and could not be a support for L's conclusion.

(C)
L's statement that he never heard his wife say she paid or received
anything for the deeds may be viewed in one of three ways: (1) The
wife's failure to speak, her silence, is equivalent to an extra-judicial
assertion that she neither paid nor received considertaion, introduced to

prove the truth of that assertion. Under this view, L's testimony would
be excluded as hearsay. (2) The wife's silence was not intended as nor
is it equivalent to an assertion, but is evidence of conduct offered to
show her belief that no payment was made and thus to prove nonpayment as the cause of that belief. Such conduct evidence may be
included within a broad definition of hearsay, but even so its exclusion
is not necessary in every case.1 (3) The wife's silence is circumstantial
evidence of conduct offered to prove non-payment, and its admissibility
is determined by the minimum requirement of relevancy, that is, the
15 Hestle v. Louisville & N. R. R, 16 Ala. App. 657, 81 So. 149 (1919) (testimony that witness did not see her trunk on station platform insufficient to take
question of trunk's arrival to jury); Jacobs v. Disharoon, 113 Md. 92, 77 AtI.
258 (1910) (witness never heard any talk of anyone else having possession of
land, inadmissible on issue of plaintiff's adverse possession); Johnson & Sons,
Inc. v. Southern Ry., 214 N. C. 484, 199 S. E. 704 (1938) (evidence that witnesses
failed to hear signal insufficient to submit to jury where witnesses probably could
not have heard signal if given); Aldana v. Aldana, 42 S. W. (2d) 661, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931) (during the ten years witness had known deceased he never knew
deceased had a 'wife, inadmissible) ; WIGMORE §160.
15" Neither the opinion nor the record on appeal show an objection by defendant
to this testimony, but plaintiff's attorney, in conversation with the writer, stated
that objection was made and overruled.
" See Falknor, Silence as Hearsay, (1940) 89 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 192; McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, (1930) 39 YALE L. J.489; Morgan, Some
Suggestions for Defining and Classifying Hearsay,, (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Rav.
258, The Hearsay Rule, (1937) 12 WASH. L. REv. 1, Hearsay and Aron-Hearsay,
(1935) 48 HARV. L. REV. 1138. Professor Morgan's definition of hearsay includes: "(1) all conduct of a person, verbal or non-verbal, intended by him to
operate as an assertion when offered either to prove the truth of the matter
asserted or to prove that the asserter believed the matter asserted to be true, and
(2) all conduct of a person, verbal or non-verbal, not intended to operate as an
assertion, when offered either to prove both his state of mind and the external
event or condition which caused him to have that state of mind or to prove that
his state of mind was truly reflected by that conduct." 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. at
263-4.
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fact to be proved must be a natural or plausible conclusion from the
evidence offered.
In practically none of the cases presenting similar problems is there
any analysis of the testimony, and in few is the hearsay objection discussed, but a consideration of these cases throws some light on the
judicial attitude toward this type of evidence. 16' Failure to complain
of rape is admissible to prove that there was no rape but intercourse by
consent. 1 7 Failure to complain of an injury is admissible to show that
no injury occurred.' 8 Failure to hear any news is admitted to show
death of a person or loss of a ship.' 9 Failure to find or hear anything
of a person after search tends to prove that the person is fictitious or
a non-resident. 20 Failure to mention a danger of employment to one's
"" Obviously, not all of these cases are strictly analogous to the principal case,
but they present related instances of the use of silence as circumstantial evidence.
" Mosley v. State, 241 Ala. 132, 1 So. (2d) 593 (1941) ; People v. Wilmot, 139
Cal. 103, 72 Pac. 838 (1903); People v. Carruthers, 379 Il1. 388, 41 N. E. (2d)
521 (1942) ; Adams v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 711, 294 S. W. 151 (1927) ; State
v. Bigley, 247 S. W. 169 (Mo. Sup. 1922) ; State v. Dill, 184 N. C. 645, 113 S. E.
609 (1922) ; State v. Smith 138 N. C. 700, 50 S. E. 859 (1905); State v. Peter,
53 N. C. 19 (1860) ; State v. Cone, 46 N. C. 18 (1853) ; State v. Golden, 90 W.
Va. 496, 111 S. E. 320 (1922) ; 52 C. J. p. 1069.
"LPeople v. Layman, 117 Cal. App. 476, 4 P. (2d) 244 (1931) (testimony that
train dispatchers had received no report of accident on night of plaintiff's alleged
injury held not hearsay and admissible); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Varner, 129
Ga. 844, 60 S. E. 162 (1908) (failure to complain of injury admitted); West
Chicago St. Ry. v. Kennelly, 170 Ill. 508, 48 N. E. 996 (1897) (daily visitor had
not heard plaintiff complain before accident, admissible on issue of whether prior
accident caused plaintiff's injury); Sullivan v. Minn. St. Ry., 161 Minn. 45, 200
N. W. 922 (1924) (evidence in personal injury action that no other claim was
made on defendant arising out of same accident admissible in discretion of trial
court); Fogg v. Oregon Short Line R. R., 78 Utah 105, 1 P. (2d) 954 (1931)
(in action for injury to knee during employment wife permitted to testify that
husband did not complain of pain in knee after prior auto accident) ; Lincoln v.
Hemenway, 80 Vt. 530, 69 Atl. 153 (1908) (neighbor did not hear of plaintiff's
injury until end of August, admissible to corroborate plaintiff's statement that injury occurred in August and not in April). Compare Southern Ry. v. Mayer,
159 S. C. 332, 157 S. E. 6 (1931) (testimony that owner of other land on railroad's right of way had not complained of encroachment excluded) with Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. v. Searson, 137 S. C. 468, 135 S. E. 567 (1926) (evidence that
neither defendant nor predecessors made any complaint as to railroad right of way
admitted).
" WIGMoR §158.
'0 Nichols v. United States, 48 F. (2d) 46 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) (postmaster
and others had never known of W. E. Smith and on inquiry could learn nothing of
him, admissible on fictitious person issue); People v. Sanders, 114 Cal. 216, 46
Pac. 153 (1896) (sheriff had searched region but unable to find trace of J. K.,
admitted to show non-existence) ; Elliott v. Georgia Power Co., 58 Ga. App. 151,
197 S. E. 914 (1938) (E. R. Smith never knew or heard of W. R. Smith, admitted); Phelps v. Nazworthy, 226 Ill. 254; 80 N. E. 756 (1907) (whether a
deed-grantee was a fictitious person; testimony that no person by that name had
ever lived in township held admissible); Kruidenier's Estate v. Bankers Trust
Co., 203 Iowa 776, 209 N. W. 452 (1926) (testimony of postmaster and officials
that no such person as C.M.P. appeared on their records or was heard of in
region) ; People v. Sharp, 53 Mich. 523, 19 N. W. 168 (1884) (sheriff's failure
to find alleged subscribing witness admissible to prove name fictitious) ; Morris v.
Equitable Life Association, 109 Neb. 348, 191 N. W. 190 (1922) (issue whether
beneficiary of policy was fictitious person; testimony of search and non-existence
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family has been admitted as evidence of ignorance of the danger. 21 The
absence of an entry in a public or private record has frequently been
used to show that an alleged transaction did not take place. 22 Failure
to deny or reply to a statement made in one's presence .is under proper
conditions an admission by silence.2 Failure to complain of food' or
merchandise, offered to show good quality, is more often excluded than
admitted, 24 but the exclusion in many cases is based on considerations
admitted); State v. Wentworth, 37 N. H. 217 (1858) (witness made inquiries
and searched but could obtain no information of alleged fictitious person, admitted) ; Thomas v. State, 54 Okla. Crim. 97, 14 P. (2d) -953 (1932), (1933) 46
HARv. L. REv. 715 (sheriff testified he was unable by inquiries to learn anything
of B. F. Smith; admissible to prove B. F. Smith was fictitious, over objection as
hearsay and prejudicial); Commonwealth v. Sweeney, 283 Pa. 520, 129 Atl. 578
(1925) (special examiner could find no heirs after 1Y years search, admissible
an issue of escheat for lack of heirs) ; cf. In re Hunt, 15 N. J. Misc. 331, 191 Atl.
437 (1937) (testimony of postmen that many registered voters were fictitious or
non-resident persons admitted). Contra: Taylor v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 381, 97
S. W. 474 (1906) (sheriff's returns of "not found" on subpoenas issued for
alleged fictitious persons as witnesses excluded). WIGMORE §§158, 664.
" Spinney's Administratrix v. 0. V. Hooker & Son, 92 Vt. 146, 102 AtI. 53
(1917) (employee's failure to mention danger from electricity to show ignorance
of danger) ; Barney v. Quaker Oats Co., 85 Vt. 372, 82 Atl. 113 (1912) (deceased
employee never mentioned to family danger of dust explosion, admitted to prove
no knowledge of danger).
" Norfolk So. Ry. v. Strickland, 264 Fed. 546 (E. D. N. C. 1920) (evidence
that search in records failed to reveal deed or contract held competent on issue
of execution of instrument) ; Reichert v. Jerome H. Sheip, Inc., 212 Ala. 300, 102
So. 440 (1924) (absence of entry in church records to prove no marriage); In
re Estate of Panico, 268 Ill. App. 585 (1932) (to prove no divorce, evidence that
records of courts have been searched where decree should be found, if granted,
held admissible); Hubbard v. Martin, 184 Ill. App. 534 (1914) (no record of
license issued to defendant's employee held competent to prove operator unlicensed
in suit for dental malpractice) ; Oelke v. Howey, 210 Iowa 1296, 232 N. W. 666
(1930) (absence of entry in financial statement to show no debt existed) ; Effron,
Kushner & Co. v. Amer. Ry. Express Co., 195 Iowa 1168, 193 N. W. 539 (1923)
(no entry of receipt of sack of furs, admitted) ; Klein v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,
309 Pa. 320, 163 Atl. 532 (1932) (absence of entry of alleged janitor's name in
records admissible to prove not employee) ; WIGMORE §§1531-56, 1633.
"'Dail v. Heath, 206 N. C. 453, 174 S. E. 318 (1934) WIGmORE §§1071-3; 31
C. J. S. §§294-7; (1929) 24 ILL. L. Ray. 488; (1930) 28 MICH. L. Rav. 1057.
"Admissible: Steil v. Holland, 3 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) (no other
complaints from purchasers of similar woolen goods) ; Baer Grocer Co. v. Barber
Milling Co., 223 Fed. 969 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915) (no complaints on flour to prove
no deterioration in quality) ; Katz v. Delohey Hat Co., 97 Conn. 665, 118 AtI. 88
(1922) (no complaints on fur from same lot as plaintiff's to Show good quality) ;
Mears v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 75 Conn. 171, 52 Atl. 610 (1902) (express
company agent receiving box from railroad made no complaint, offered to show
that box was then in good condition) ; Ogden v. Rosedale Inn, 189 So. 162 (La.
App. 1939) (no other complaints about shrimp salad held "of great value . . . in
determining genuineness of plaintiff's claim"); MacLehan v. Loft Candy Stores,
172 So. 367 (La. App. 1937) (no other complaints from 300 mince pies sold) ;
Schuler v. Union News Co., 295 Mass. 350, 4 N. E. (2d) 465 (1936) (no other
complaints from 300 turkey sandwiches sold on particular day and from all sandwiches sold during year); Monahan v. Economy Grocery Stores Corp., 282 Mass.
548, 185 N. E. 34 (1938) (no complaints received on any other of 72,000 cans of
corn sold by defendant); Landfield v. Albiani Lunch Co., 268 Mass. 528, 168
N. E. 160 (1929) (absence of complaints about food held "competent evidence
that it was not unwholesome"); Gracey v. Waldorf System, 251 Mass. 76, 146
N. E. 232 (1925) (no complaints on food); Kinston Cotton Mills v. Rocky Mount
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of relevancy, such as dissimilarity of circumstances. Failure to mention
a will, contract or other fact to one's family or friends is generally
25
inadmissible to prove non-existence of the fact.
Hosiery Co., 154 N. C. 462, 70 S. E. 910 (1911) (correspondence showing complaints and evidence of no complaints on yarn both admitted) ; St. Louis S. W.
Ry. v. Arkansas & T. Grain Co., 95 S. W. 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) (failure
of other purchasers of corn to complain admitted over hearsay objection; compare
with later Texas cases below); cf. H. & L. M. Warten Cotton Co. v. McGuire,
206 Ala. 469, 91 So. 308 (1921) (fact that plaintiff heard no complaints of his
work admissible under circumstances of the case on issue of plaintiff's incompetence). Inadmissible: United States v. 11% Dozen Packages, Etc., 40 F. Supp.
208 (W. D. N. Y. 1941) (no complaints received on drug over ten-year period
held incompetent as "clearly hearsay") ; Winter-Loeb Grocery Co. v. Boykin, 203
Ala. 187, 82 So. 437 (1919) (sale of seeds); Siegel, King & Co. v. Penny &
Baldwin, 176 Ark. 336, 2 S.W. (2d) 1082 (1928) (no complaints on other pipe
sold inadmissible because circumstances may have been different and purchasers may
have been damaged without complaining); Watson v. Bigelow Co., 77 Conn. 124,
58 Atl. 741 (1904) (evidence that several small boilers were installed and operated
without complaint inadmissible to prove same design or plan suitable for much
larger boiler; objections of court were collateral issue, surprise, slight probative
force and irrelevance because of dissimilar circumstances); Hutchinson Lumber
Co. v. Dickerson, 127 Ga. 328, 56 S. E. 491 (1907) (others' acceptance of lumber
irrelevant on issue of breach of warranty on defendant's lumber) ; Van Lill Co.
v. Frederick City Packing Co., 155 Md. 303, 141 Atl. 898 (1928) (absence of
complaints from purchasers of rejected corn too remote to have probative force) ;
Webster v. Moore & Son, 108 Md. 572, 71 Atl. 466 (1908) (that other tomatoes
were sold as No: 3 standard and accepted as such without complaint irrelevant on
issue of quality of tomatoes sold defendant); Osborne & Co. v. Bell, 62 Mich.
214, 28 N. W. 841 (1886) (no complaints on other machines sold, irrelevant as
to workability of this machine); Bloom's Son Co. v. Haas, 130 Mo. App. 122 108
S. W. 1078 (1908) (shipments of rice to others without complaint held wholly
irrelevant and highly prejudicial to defendant) ; New York Canners v. Milbourne,
247 N. Y. 460, 160 N. E. 914 (1928) (no other complaints of defects in canned
potatoes; excluded because no showing of similar circumstances); James K.
Thomson Co. v. International Compositions Co., 191 App. Div. 553, 181 N. Y.
Supp. 637 (1920) (evidence that rejected goods were sold to others without complaint inadmissible as hearsay); Altkrug v. William Whitman Co., 185 App. Div.
744, 173 N. Y. Supp. 669 (1919) (no complaints from sale of rejected goods declared "hearsay evidence as to opinions of other customers") ; Shaw Cotton Mills
v. Acme Hosiery Mills, 181 N. C. 33, 106 S.E. 24 (1921) (statements in letters
that rejected goods had been resold without compliant were "at most .. .selfserving, and tended only to prove a negative"; their exclusion by trial court was
not reversible error); Reed Grocery Co. v. Miller, 36 Okla. 134, 128 Pac. 271
(1912) (no complaints from other sales of hominy "wholly irrelevant"); Goldsmith v. Ohio Truss Co., 283 S. W. 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (on issue of
whether plaintiff shipped more goods than defendant ordered, evidence that no
others complained of receiving too many goods excluded) ; Elmberg Co. v. Dunlap
Hdw. Co., 267 S. W. 258 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924) (no complaints from other
machines held irrelevant) ; George W. Saunders Live Stk. Comm. Co. v. Kincaid,
168 S.W. 977 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (failure of other packers to complain of
disease in hogs inadmissible as hearsay); Hill v. Hanan & Son, 62 Tex. Civ. App.
567, 82 S.W. 532 (1904) (no complaints from other machines, excluded because
similar conditions not proven).
" Admissible: Latham v. Houston Land & Trust Co., 62 S.W. (2d) 519 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933) (testimony that widow and attorney had never heard alleged
settlor mention trust fund held not hearsay and admissible on issue of existence
of fund) ; Sloan v. Sloan, 32 S.W. (2d) 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (deceased
did not state at dinner party that he and plaintiff were married, admitted on issue
of marriage) ; Donovan v. Selinas, 85 Vt. 80, 81 Atl. 235 (1911) (fact that member of household never heard husband claim ownership of property relevant to
show wife's ownership).
Inadmissible: Planters' Chemical & Oil Co. v. Stearnes, 189 Ala. 503, 66 So.
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The cases point to two conclusions. First, courts are much more
likely to admit evidence of negative conduct or silence where evidence
of a positive nature on the same point would be admissible. Thus,
complaint of rape or injury would come in as corroboration or under
an exception to the hearsay rule for statements of physical condition
or spontandous exclamations. 26 Replies to a searcher's questions, acknowledging acquaintance with a person or giving directions. as to his
whereabouts, would be admissible because used as circumstantial evidence of such person's existence and not to prove the truth of the
replies. 27 Likewise, an employee's comments about danger would be
admitted to show his knowledge, but not to prove that danger existed.
28
Regular entries in records are within an exception to the hearsay rule.
So are admissions, whether by statement or by silence. On the other
hand, complaints about food or merchandise, and remarks about wills,
contracts, business transactions, etc., are clearly banned by the hearsay
rule.
Second, to strengthen the inference from a person's silence about an
event to non-occurrence of the event, a showing that if the event had
occurred it would have been important to him to speak out, or that
failure to do so would have been detrimental, is desirable, if not necessary.29 The disadvantages of failure to complain of rape or injury or
failure to deny an incriminating assertion made in one's presence are
obvious. The detrimental effect of silence in the face of poor quality
food or goods argues for the admissibility of this type of evidence. On
the other band, the fact that a wife did not reveal her financial transactions to her husband might be a benefit rather than a detriment to
her; this is a real weakness of the evidence in the principal case.
Of the three possible views on the final testimony of witness L, the
699 (1914) (testimony that signers never heard any of other signers say they
signed notes individually inadmissible except as it tends to contradict plaintiff's
evidence that they signed as individuals); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 22 Ala. 529 (1853)
(relatives and neighbors of decedent had not heard of will before his death);
Segars v. City of Cornelia, 60 Ga. App. 457, 4 S. E. (2d) 60 (1939) (that wife
said nothing to husband about signing easement, though they consulted each other
about all business transactions, excluded; wife's denial of signing would be hearsay); Sherling v. Continental Trust Co., 175 Ga. 672, 165 S. E. 560 (1932)
'(testator never said anything to witnesses about alleged oral contract of testator,
to prove no contract existed; held irrelevant, immaterial and in nature of hearsay); Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901) (testimony
that defendant's son never heard anything said in family about defendant having
trouble with her stepdaughter, and never heard stepdaughter mention that defendant injured her); Lake Drainage Commissioners v. Spencer, 174 N. C. 36,
93 S. E. 435 (1917); Karlen v. Trebble, 45 S. D. 570, 189 N. W. 519 (1922)
(witness living with plaintiff had not heard plaintiff's mother or father or anyone
else claim ownership of auto, held incompetent for any purpose).
, WIGMOaE §§1134-42, 1714-23, 1760-4.

'Id. at §1789.
291d. at §§1517-61, 1630-84, 1702-8.
" Falknor, supra note 16, at 215-7.
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third is the soundest by analysis. The weakness of the first view, that
silence is the equivalent of an assertion, is that it overlooks the nonassertive quality of this conduct, When conduct is intended to convey
thought, as when a criminal makes a pre-arranged signal to his confederate, it should be treated just as an assertion. But a failure to mention
payment or non-payment of a debt to a spouse is no more intended as
an assertion than a failure to complain of a shipment of goods or a
failure to stop a car at a clear, unobstructed intersection. As a result
no question of the veracity or narration of the actor is involved, and
there is no necessity for cross-examination of the actor as to these
factors before accepting the testimony of the witness 3 0
The second theory is that the relevance of this conduct as evidence
depends on inferences from A's conduct to belief to fact believed, and
that dangers inherent in hearsay are sufficiently present to require its
classification as hearsay. 3 ' Admitting that A's veracity and narration
are not involved, the argument runs that since A's belief must accurately
reflect the fact or event for the evidence to be competent, A's perception
and memory are important; and opportunity to cross-examine A to discover unconscious errors in perception and memory is as necessary
as with ordinary hearsay declarations.3 2 However, differences between
evidence of inaction or silence offered to prove a negative fact and evidence of positive action or conduct are discernible. There can be no
interval of time between the inaction or silence and the negative fact
which it is offered to prove, and hence no opportunity for failure of
memory. For example, X's failure tW complain of an injury at any time
is offered to show that he was not injured at any time; X's state of
mind is continuous and contemporaneous with both the conduct (silence) and the fact to be proved (no injury). As for perception, the
opportunities for error here are minimized by the fact that the proof is
of the non-occurrence of an event, and the actor is in a position to know
definitely by observation that the event did not occur.
The true weaknesses of L's testimony that he never heard his spouse
say anything about the transaction are not inadequacies in her observation, memory, narration and veracity which would be revealed by crossexamination of the wife. Thus the reasons for the hearsay rule are not
present and the rule should not be applied to this evidence.
The real objection to the testimony lies in the inferences which must
be drawn to make the wife's silence relevant as circumstantial evidence
of non-payment. The disturbing question is whether the assumption
is justified that if L's wife had paid she would have told him, and
" WiGmoRE §459; Falknor, supra, at 195-201.

"' Morgan, mtpra note 16, passim.
" Morgan, supra note 16, 48 HARV. L. REv. at 1141-3.
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whether, if this assumption be granted, the evidence is of sufficient probative value to meet the minimum test for admissibility. In most of the
cases cited, the hearsay rule is not discussed, and the evidence is admitted or excluded on the basis of its relevancy; this indicates that the
third view of this conduct evidence is simplest and most natural. The
test should be the same for silence as for other circumstantial evidence:
Does the fact of silence point to the non-happening of the event or condition as a natural or plausible hypothesis out of the various ones conceivable?3 Or are the inferences from silence to non-occurrence too
weak to make the proffered evidence relevant as judicial proof?
To admit the evidence of silence on a particular issue of fact, the
trial judge should find, using an objective test, that the silence was not
intended as an assertion, that the silent individual knew or had sufficient opportunity to know the fact, and that the other circumstances lend
support to the inference that if the fact had been otherwise there would
have been no silence. Judged by this test, L's statement that he never
heard his wife say she paid or received any money might well have been
admitted as tending to prove that no consideration changed hands.
More important than the particular ruling of the lower court, however,
is the attitude of the Supreme Court on appeal. To secure a flexible
and sensible operation of this rule a broad discretion must be given the
trial judge, and his ruling, whether to admit or exclude, should be upheld unless in the opinion of the appellate court it contributes materially
to an incorrect result below.
WALLACE C. MURCHISON.

"WIGmORE §§24-36.

